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How much is the timber from public forests worth? How can the Public Forest Service define a fair market price 
for standing timber lots? What is the cost of low participation in French timber auctions? To estimate the value 
of a timber lot we adopt the transaction-evidence appraisal approach using data from timber auctions in Lorraine 
(Eastern France) accounting for the facts that: (i) the seller‟s reserve prices are secret, (ii) there remain many 
unsold  lots,  and  (iii)  the  number  of  bidders  varies  from  one  auction  to  another.  Taking  into  account  the 
endogenous participation in our hedonic price equation for the highest bid, we estimate that, compared to lots 
that receive two bids, the highest bid is 22% lower when there is only one bid and 37% higher when there are 
three or more bids. 
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1  Introduction 
Fifty percent of hardwood timber lots in public timber auctions in Lorraine (Eastern France) 
received zero, one or only two bids and 42% of lots have not been auctioned (Costa and 
Préget, 2004). Moreover, 40% of auctioned lots were sold under the seller‟s secret reserve 
price. Low participation is a real issue in French public timber auction. But more generally, 
how much is the timber from public forests worth? How can the Public Forest Service define 
a fair market price for standing timber lots? Answering these questions is challenging. First, it 
is  difficult  to  refer to  production costs.  Indeed, a forest  takes  time to  grow and expand. 
Timber supply is more a harvesting decision based on silvicultural motives and related to the 
management  of  a  renewable  natural  resource,  than  just  a  question  of  wood  production. 
Secondly, the seller (the Public Forest Service) wants to maximize sales receipts, but also has 
other objectives, such as securing the timber supply to the wood local industry at a price that 
allows them to remain competitive on international markets and/or against other industries 
(steel, aluminum, etc.). Thus, the objectives of the seller might be multiple and contradictory. 
Third, standing timber is different from perishable goods. The optimal time for harvesting 
might have passed if the lot remains unsold for many years, but the trees continue to grow 
and the forest still offers other values (recreation, carbon sequestration, biodiversity, water 
filtration, …) that are difficult to take into account when defining the value of a timber lot. To 
sum up, it is difficult for the seller to evaluate her own reservation value for a lot in standing 
timber sales. 
 
Yet, even if the Public Forest Service uses an auction system to set the selling price, the sales 
director needs to set a relevant reserve price for each timber lot that he wants to sell. Given 
that assessing the value of a standing timber lot is challenging, the seller needs to refer to 
demand factors such as: lot quality, species composition, lot location, harvesting conditions, 
etc. In this article, we use the so called “transaction evidence appraisal” (TEA) reduced form 
method,  i.e.  we  estimate  timber  value  from  market  prices  obtained  during  past  timber 
auctions in France. 
   3 
Most French timber sales are sequential first-price sealed-bid auctions of heterogeneous lots. 
Heterogeneity in the product is probably the most important feature of standing timber sales. 
Lots  differ  from  each  other  with  respect  to  volume,  composition,  location,  harvesting 
conditions, etc. (inter lots heterogeneity). But a lot is also composed of trees of different 
species and qualities (intra lot heterogeneity). These inter- and intra-lot heterogeneities raise 
various questions about the valuation of the lots that are put on sale and about their optimal 
composition. Heterogeneity of timber lots makes the hedonic price function approach useful 
in order to infer appraisal value since many characteristics may influence the stumpage price. 
The hedonic price method is based on the implicit price of each characteristic and determines 
how the market values a lot as a set of characteristics. This empirical approach to timber 
characteristics could help the Forest Service to design the auctioned lots (the size, the species 
composition, etc.) and to determine her reserve price. 
 
There are two problems that arise when we analyze timber auction data sets. Both arise from 
the endogenous participation of the bidders in the auctions. First, there are many lots for 
which there is no bid and there are good reasons to think that this outcome is not random: 
bidders  may  not  bid  on  timber  lots  that  are  of  bad  quality  or  have  difficult  harvesting 
conditions, etc. It is important to note that in French timber auctions, the seller does not 
announce any reserve price. The seller might withdraw the lot if she thinks the highest bid is 
too low, but the reserve price is kept secret before the auction. Thus, the lack of bids cannot 
be explained by a reserve price that is set too high, since no minimum amount is required to 
bid for a lot. Of course, lots with no submission remain unsold. However, we have to take 
lots  without bids into account  in  the estimation procedure in  order to  prevent  a possible 
sample selection bias. Secondly, when there are bids submitted for the lot, the degree of 
competition varies from one auction to another. According to the independent private values 
auction model, the number of bidders has a positive impact on the bidding strategies in first-
price auctions. Indeed, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders increases. 
Moreover,  there  are  many  auctions  with  only  one  bidder.  This  special  case  needs  to  be 
analyzed with caution. Remember that the number of bids cannot be explained by the value 
of the reserve price here, so it is sensible to think that the number of bidders is driven by the 
characteristics of the lot. In other words, the number of bidders has to be included in the 
hedonic price equation as an endogenous explanatory variable. 
   4 
From an econometric point of view, the main problem is related to the correlation between 
unobservable variables that determine the participation process and the auction result. We 
solve this challenge by specifying a 3-equation model: equation (1) defines the probability 
that there is no bid, equation (2) determines among submitted lots the degree of competition, 
and equation (3) is the hedonic price equation that explains the auction result. We estimate 
parameters of this system of simultaneous equations using a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov 




Our empirical work contributes to the literature on timber value appraisal by explicitly 
modeling the fact that the seller‟s reserve price is not announced. This is the main difference 
with the existing stumpage appraisal literature (discussed in the next section) that uses the 
Tobit two-stage procedure. Indeed, we cannot explain bidders' participation by the level of 
the reserve price. In this article, bidder participation directly depends on the characteristics of 
the  timber  lot.  Secondly,  we  take  into  account  the  fact  that  bidders'  participation  is 
endogenous and we measure the cost of low competition in timber auctions. 
 
In the next section, we specify our objective and our empirical approach through a survey of 
the literature on timber auctions and timber appraisal. Section 3 describes the institutional 
framework of French public timber auctions and the data set. The methodology is detailed in 
section 4 and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes our research. 
2  Timber appraisal 
It is not straightforward for the seller to know below which price she should not sell a timber 
lot, even when she sees the highest  bid.  Theoretically, the seller‟s (reservation) value  v0 
corresponds to the price under which the seller would get no profit from the transaction. That 
value is usually supposed to be exogenous, contrary to the reserve price which is strategically 
                                                 
1 See Poirier and Tobias (2007) for instance for a general introduction on this topic. The idea is to replace 
methods based on maximum likelihood that often do not converge in complicated settings. 
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chosen by the seller. The seller commits not to sell the good below the reserve price. Of 
course, if the seller has perfect information on her private value v0, the reserve price should 
not be lower than v0. But actually, we claim that the seller does not  perfectly know her v0 
when the auction takes place. We can see v0 as the best expected price that the seller could 
obtain in a future sale. That value depends on many features. For example, it depends not 
only on future global market conditions and macro variables, but also on how the market is 
valuing each characteristic of the lot. It is with respect to the latter feature that we want to 
improve timber appraisal. Our objective is to use the results of past timber auctions to build a 
hedonic price equation. 
 
We propose a reduced form procedure based on timber transaction evidence appraisal (TEA) 
to  estimate  the  value  of  a  timber  lot  and  the  cost  of  low  participation  in  French  timber 
auctions. The TEA method relies on the results of past timber sales, usually auctions, for 
predicting stumpage prices.
2 Unsold timber lots were not considered in early regression-based 
models (e.g. Jackson and McQuillan, 1979, McQuillan and Johnson -True, 1988). Prescott 
and Puttock (1990) and Puttock, Prescott and Meilke (1990) propose a standard hedonic price 
function to forecast stumpage prices in Southern Ontario timber sales; there was no unsold 
lots  in  their  data.  Buongiorno  and  Young  (1984)  modeled  winning  bids  using  OLS 
conditional on timber auctions that r eceived at least two bids. However, as Huang and 
Buongiorno (1986) argued, the fact that some timber lots remained unsold is important 
market information. Thus, the following transaction evidence appraisal models include this 
market information to prevent biased predictions of market values. Since the reserve price is 
known and announced before the auctions in U.S. timber sales, it is assumed that the reserve 
price explains why some lots are not sold. Therefore, to take into account unsold lots, 
censored regressions (Tobit models) have been conducted (Huang and Buongiorno, 1986). 
Niquidet and van Kooten (2004) do not have sufficient information on no -bid auctions (or 
non-submitted lots), so they seek to predict a fair market value of standing timber in Briti sh 
Columbia using a two-stage truncated regression procedure. 
 
                                                 
2 Before the TEA method was introduced in the 1980‟s, the residual value approach was used. The residual 
value mainly represents the price of all the products likely to result from a particular timber lot, subtracting all 
the processing costs. (Nautiyal, 1980)   6 
Beyond the treatment of unsold lots, the number of bidders also appears as an important 
variable in the estimation of the winning bid in stumpage appraisal literature. Indeed, the 
degree of competition in auctions has an impact on the bidding strategies. Participants do not 
necessarily know the actual number of bidders, but they bid according to the expected or 
potential competition (Brannman 1996). Many studies on timber auctions such as Johnson 
(1979), Hansen (1986), and Sendack (1991) empirically support the auction theory prediction 
that  there  is  a  positive relationship  between  the  number  of  bidders  and  the  value  of  the 
highest bid. Sendack (1991) explicitly examines the impact of the number of bidders on the 
winning bid by including a transformation of the number of bids submitted as an explanatory 
variable. Assigning a dummy variable to each number of bidders (n = 1, n = 2, …, n = 11), 
Brannman, Klein and Weiss (1987) obtained estimated coefficients that support first-price 
auction theory: bid shading is decreasing with the number of bidders. None of these studies 
endogenize participation. However, to use stumpage appraisal models as predictive tools it is 
necessary  to  endogenize  the  actual  number  of  bidders.  Examining  the  impact  of  the 
(announced) reserve prices in sealed-bid Federal timber auctions, Carter and Newman (1998) 
endogenize the number of bidders in a simultaneous-two-equations Tobit framework, but the 
expected number of bidders is determined strictly by the reserve price.
3 Of course, this model 
does not fit French timber auctions since the reserve price is secret. 
 
Parallel to the reduced form approach, there is a recent but important and growing literature 
on structural econometrics of auctions. See for example Laffont and Vuong (1996), Perrigne 
and Vuong Q. (1999), Athey and Haile (2002), Paarsch and Hong (2006) for surveys . The 
aim  of  this  highly  technical  and  sophisticated  literature  is  to  estimate  the  structural 
parameters of a well defined theoretical auction model so as to simulate new auction formats. 
The main drawback of this approach is that a tractable theoretical model needs first to be 
solved at least partially. Auction theory has developed a great deal during the last t hree 
decades, nevertheless our understanding of real auction sales is far from complete. Although 
timber auctions have many special features that distinguish them from most theoretical 
auction models, some articles in the structural econometrics of auction s literature rely on 
timber auction data: Paarsch (1997), Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), Li and Perrigne 
(2003), Athey, Levin and Siera (2004), and Campo,  Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2006), 
                                                 
3 They treat the number of bidders as a continuous variable.   7 
among others. The main objective of these articles is to compare the results of different 
auction formats. In most structural timber auction studies, as in our data, there is a variable 
called the seller‟s estimate or the appraisal value. Usually that value is found to be a summary 
of all the other variables (such as quality, species composition, harvesting condition, etc). 
Most papers use only that variable to take into account the object heterogeneity between 
auctions. In contrast, we want to improve on the appraisal value of the seller. Therefore, we 
will  focus  on  all  other  variables  that  might  influence  her  reservation  value.  Beside,  the 
purpose of a hedonic price model is also to discover some specific patterns in the data that 
can be used by analysts to develop suitable structural models. 
 
We propose to estimate a hedonic price function based on the highest bids. The highest bid of 
an auction is not necessary a winning bid (and thus a market price) since the seller might 
withdraw the lot if she believes  that the highest  bid  is too low. However, we choose to 
estimate the highest bid and not the sale price because the sale price is not independent from 
the seller‟s decision (because of the secrete reserve price) and thus is less informative about 
market demand.
4 
3  Data on French timber auctions 
Competitive  bidding  is  widely  used  in  timber  sales  in  France.  In  particular,  the  French 
National Public Forest Service (ONF
5) uses first-price sealed-bid auctions to sell timber from 
public forest. Timber auctions of ONF, which represent 40% of the timber sold each year in 
France, generally concern standing timber. The auction mechanism seems to be the best way 
to determine an "objective" or a "fair" market price for such a heterogeneous product. Before 
presenting the dataset on fall timber auctions in Lorraine conducted by ONF  in 2003, we 
describe the institutional framework of French timber auctions. 
                                                 
4 There is a difference between the highest bid and the private value of the highest bidder. According to auction 
theory, buyers in first-price sealed-bid auctions do not bid their valuation. However, we do not attempt to infer 
the bidders‟ private value here. Our aim is more to build a price equation for a fair market price based on lots 
characteristics. 
5 ONF stands for Office National des Forêts.   8 
Timber auctions are sequential auctions of heterogeneous goods since many different lots 
(usually more than one hundred) are put on sale one after the other; the result of the auction 
of a lot is given before the next lot is put on sale. The first lot is usually randomly drawn, next 
the  auctioneer  follows  the  catalogue  order.  The  sale  catalogue  details  all  the  lots  and  is 
available to the bidders before the sale. 
 
Lots  are  heterogeneous  (different  from  one  another),  but  they  are  also  made  up  of 
heterogeneous wood. In particular in standing timber sales, a lot may contain many species of 
different diameter and of different quality. Auctioning such a product raises the problem of 
the optimal lot composition. The successive auctions correspond to different lots, but lots 
might be interrelated. Some lots may be close substitutes while others may present synergies. 
For example, it may be only profitable for some buyers to harvest two or more lots that are 
close to each other. 
 
Taking into account the heterogeneity of the lots raises practical issues. Potential buyers visit 
the lots that they intend to buy, so as to infer their own private value for the lot. From a 
buyer's point of view, the estimated value of a lot is different than from the seller‟s point of 
view. Buyers have information on harvesting costs, on what they will produce with the wood 
and at what price they will be able to sell their products. It is therefore easier for them than 
for sellers to estimate their reservation value for a given lot. Therefore, as in most timber 
auction  models,  we  believe  that  each  bidder  knows  his  private  reservation  value  for  a 
particular lot, especially for hardwood lots. That value depends on the characteristics of the 
lot, but may also depend on his inventory (i.e. on which lots the buyer already bought, and on 
whether he still needs wood). Nevertheless, bidders have to prospect 5 to 10 times as many 
lots as they intend to buy since they are not guaranteed to obtain the lots that they want. This 
leads  to  non-negligible  prospecting  costs  for  the  bidders.
6  These search costs, which are 
linked to the heterogeneity of the product, are wasteful from a social perspective. Reducing 
the cost of preparing a bid in timber auctions may increase the number of bidders.  Actually, 
Gal, Landsberger and Nemirovski (2007) analyse participation to an auction as part of 
equilibrium. In an auction model with bi -dimensional distribution of types and endogenous 
                                                 
6 See Leffler and Rucker (1991) and Leffler, Rucker and Munn (2000) on transaction costs in timber auctions.   9 
distribution of participants, they show that it can be profitable for the auctioneer to partially 
reimbursing bidders for the cost of preparing bids. 
 
As mentioned above, and contrary to North American timber auctions, the reserve price of 
the seller is not announced in French public timber auctions. It is kept secret. This singular 
practice has been studied in the literature, but is difficult to justify theoretically. Elyakime, 
Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) show in an independent private value auction model that 
the seller is always better off announcing her reserve price. Nevertheless, the practice of a 
secret reserve price is sometimes justified either by the fact that announcing a reserve price 
reduces the participation of the bidders or by a common value component (Vincent, 1995). 
Risk aversion is also mentioned to justify a secret reserve price (Li and Tan, 2000). A lack of 
competition for some lots and ONF‟s willingness to maintain a reasonable timber price may 
also explain this practice. Finally, a secret reserve price may be used to prevent collusion 
between bidders at the reserve price. When the reserve price is not announced, the optimal 
secret reserve price should be equal to the seller‟s reservation value v0. 
 
We believe that the seller prefers not to announce and commit to any reserve price mainly 
because  she  does  not  know  her  reservation  value  at  the  auction  time  as  claimed  in  the 
previous section. Indeed, a (secret) reserve price is reported for each lot in the database, but 
this price is not the seller‟s reservation value since many auctioned lots (about 40% in our 
data set) are sold under this reserve price (which should theoretically be equal to the seller‟s 
private valuation v0). This means that the French public Forest Service decides to sell or not a 
lot at the last moment and does not commit to any reserve price before the auction. So, the 
seller uses the bids to adjust her valuation v0 of the lot. With this privilege, the seller keeps a 
certain flexibility to manage the sale, but that practice may be costly for the seller from an 
auction theoretical point of view. Without firm and credible commitment, ONF may lose a 
part of the benefit of an auction. If the bidders anticipate that the seller can modify the rules 
of the game, then they will modify their bidding strategy, which may lower the efficiency of 
the bidding mechanism. Nevertheless, the fact that the seller updates her reserve prices shows 
her difficulty to assess her value v0 of a lot. Hence, announcing a reserve price might have 
negative consequences if the model used to set reserve prices is mis-specified. Indeed, a 
reserve price set too high can result in no bids, while a reserve price set too low may result in 
too  much  bid  shading  especially  since  the  number  of  bidders  is  usually  low  in  timber 
auctions.   10 
The dataset we use is part of the data collected by Costa and Préget (2004). It relies on the 
auction results of the ten fall 2003 timber sales of Lorraine, a Region of the eastern part of 
France. A total of 2262 lots were put on sale. Since there are many differences between 
hardwood  and  softwood  valuations,  we  select  only  pure  hardwood  lots,  i.e.  lots  that  are 
composed of more than 99% of hardwood. Between September 9
th and October 28
th 2003, 
1205 hardwood lots have been put on sale. Lots may be very heterogeneous and made up of 
many species. The Herfindahl index is used to measure intra lot heterogeneity.
7 Out of the 
1205 hardwood lots put on sale, only 52% of the lots are put on sale for the first time; thus 
48% of the lots correspond to previously unsold lots. 
 
At the end of the auctions, lots may be classified according to the auction results. A lot sold 
during the auction is said to be “auctioned”, whereas the others are called “unsold lots”. The 
percentage of unsold lots is 42% and shows a relatively difficult wood market environment in 
the Lorraine area during that period. It is useful to distinguish between lots that got one or 
more bids but have nevertheless been withdrawn by the seller and lots that got no bid at all, 
referred to as the “no bid” category. Table 1 presents sale results according to the number of 
bidders. In the data there are up to 13 bids for a lot, but the most frequent case is when there 
is only one bid. 
 
Table 1. Timber auction results 
Number of bids  0  1  2  3 and more  Total 
Auctioned lots  -  112 (9%)  106 (9%)  477 (40%)  695 (58%) 
Unsold lots 
Withdrawn lots  -  115 (10%)  77 (6%)  126 (10%)  318 (26%) 
No bid  192 (16%)  -  -  -  192 (16%) 
Total number of lots  192 (16%)  227 (19%)  183 (15%)  603 (50%)  1205 (100%) 
 
In our empirical application, we first propose to distinguish timber lots which received no bid 
and  lots  for  which  we  observe  at  least  one  bid.  Second,  among  the  submitted  lots,  we 
distinguish 3 categories depending on the level of competition (i.e. the number of bidders): 
i)  there is no competition: 1 bid, 
                                                 
7 The Herfindahl index is the sum of the square volume proportion of each species. Here the number of species 
is limited to 7, then the Herfindahl index varies from 0.14 to 1. The more homogeneous the lot, the closer is the 
index to one.   11 
ii)  there is limited competition: 2 bids, 
iii)  there is strong competition for the lot: 3 bids or more. 
 
The database of Costa  and Préget  (2004) includes  more than one hundred variables that 
represent a large part of the information available in the catalogues. It also includes private 
information from ONF (harvesting conditions, quality of the lot, secret reserve price), data 
about the auction results (the number of bids, the auctioned prices) and computed data such 
as the Herfindahl index. This database is particularly rich. Moreover, it is exhaustive since it 
contains all the standing timber lots from public forests put on sale in the region during the 
fall of 2003. Nevertheless, the data set does not contain any information about the bidders. 
The following two tables give summary statistics of variables used in our econometric study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for binary variables 
Variable  % 
No restrictions  37.18 
Cutting   
   arranged cutting  52.70 
   other cutting  4.40 
   selection cutting  1.08 
   accidental products  2.74 
   regeneration cutting  39.09 
Previously unsold  48.22 
Harvesting conditions   
   easy logging & extraction  27.22 
   normal logging  58.76 
   difficult logging  2.74 
   difficult logging & extraction  7.97 
   very difficult logging & extraction  3.15 
Mitraille (scrap-iron, grape-shot from the first world war)   
   no mitraille  77.56 
   light mitraille  13.72 
   average mitraille  05.99 
   heavy mitraille  2.74 
Stand, crop   
   high forest  29.71 
   conversion of a stand  62.41   12 
   coppice forest  0.58 
   coppice with standards  7.30 
   state-owned forest  25.89 
   community-owned forest  74.11 
Landing area   
   unarranged  80.41 
   arranged  15.93 
   none  3.65 
Quality   
   very good  4.07 
   good  34.85 
   normal  45.64 
   mediocre  12.61 
   bad  2.66 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Surface (in hectare)  12.41  10.38  0.20  104.04 
Number of trees  238.27  205.63  21  2259 
Number of poles  267.07  663.76  0  11366 
Herfindahl index  0.6007  0.1949  0.3337  1.0000 
Stem volume of the mean-tree  1.0623  0.7314  0.0596  4.7190 
Oak volume without crown  94.51  115.98  0  859.98 
Beech volume without crown  136.83  164.09  0  1365.80 
Other hardwood volume without crown  67.66  97.25  0  838.60 
Crown hardwood volume   166.62  153.64  0  1196.47 
Coppice volume  0.33  5.39  0  153.83 
Relative order of the auction  0.50  0.29  0  1 
 
All  continuous  variables  are  defined  in  logs  except  variables  in  percentage  such  as  the 
Herfindahl index, the variable used to give the relative order of the auction in the sale and the 
stem volume of the mean-tree. Thirty six percent of the auctioned lots are sold at a price 
lower than the seller reserve price. These figures show that the seller does not commit to a 
credible  reserve price  and takes  her decision to  accept  or not  the highest  bid  at  the last 
moment. Thus, the “a priori” reserve price of our data set has not a clear significance.   13 
4  Methodology 
Participation in timber auctions raises two econometric problems. First, many lots receive no 
bid and thus remain unsold at the end of the sale. Secondly, the number of bidders in an 
auction has an impact on the result of the auction: it makes a big difference if there is only 
one bidder (no competition) or if there are two or more bidders that compete for the same lot.
8 
Nevertheless, participation depends on the characteristics of the lots and thus is endogenous 
from an econometric point of view. We propose a reduced form econometric methodology 
that simultaneously deals with non -submitted lots (sample selection) and an endogenous 
number of bidders in the hedonic price function. We explicitly model participation by 
constructing J  categories;  but  as  announced before, we will consider 3 categories  in  our 
application: 1 bid, 2 bids, and 3 bids or more. We explain the intensity of participation by the 
characteristics of the lots in an ordinal probit framework. 
 
We propose a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling algorithm. We know 
that classical maximum likelihood procedures might be unreliable, even when we analyze the 
issues of sample selection and endogenous explanatory variable separately. We are not aware 
of any study that deals with both issues at the same time as it would require three correlation 
coefficients to estimate. The existing maximum likelihood estimation procedures (such as 
simulated maximum likelihood) do not perform well with multiple correlation coefficients 
and sample selection (see Waelbroeck, 2005). This justifies our Bayesian algorithm that is 
more reliable to produce robust correlation coefficients. The idea is to simulate the (latent) 
variables that determine the participation outcomes, which greatly simplifies the analysis of 
the joint posterior distribution of the parameters.
9 We propose a slightly different MCMC 
algorithm for the sample selection part of the model than Van Hasselt (2005). We write the 
latent model as a SUR model with an unequal number of observations; and thus inference on 
the coefficients of the observed equation only relies on observations that are not censored. 
 
                                                 
8 Even when there is only one bidder, the submitted bid can not be too low because it has to reach the secret 
reserve price of the seller in order to become a winning bid. 
9 Indeed, latent variables can be simulated and, conditional on these variables, the model is a simple Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model that is easy to deal with. We use a Metropolis step to draw from the 
conditional posterior distribution of the elements of the covariance matrix of the unobservable variables.   14 
Despite the importance of the issue of sample selection with endogenous variables, we are 
not aware of a study that deals simultaneously with these two issues. On the one hand, the 
problem of sample selection has been widely analyzed in the econometrics literature starting 
with  the  seminal  work  of  Heckman,  who  proposed  a  method  (Heckit)  to  correct  sample 
selection bias. Van Hasselt (2005) has  proposed a  Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain 
(MCMC) algorithm to make inference on the correlation coefficient of the sample selection 
model.  The  author  conducts  a  Monte  Carlo  study  that  shows  that  the  Gibbs  sampling 
algorithm  performs  well  regardless  of  whether  the  parameters  of  the  model  are  fully 
identified  or  not.
10  On the other hand, Chakravarty and Li (2003) propose a Bayesian 
algorithm to test the effect of an endogenous binary variable on the profits of a trader (we are 
not aware of another similar study). They propose a simple Gibbs sampling algorithm that 
alternates between conditional posterior probability distribution of the parameters. They find 
no evidence of significant correlation between traders' private information and their profits. 
 
We contribute to the econometric literature on two points. First, we deal with three 
correlation coefficients because we have three unobservable variables in our model, while 
Chakravarty and Li (2003) and Van Hasselt (2005) only have to deal with one  correlation 
coefficient. Secondly, both articles reparameterize the elements of the covariance matrix that 
simplify the sampling procedure and speed up the rate of convergence of the simulated 
Markov chain. Their algorithms might not be optimal with likel ihood functions of irregular 
shapes. We have included a Metropolis step from the conditional posterior distribution of the 
covariance matrix that sometimes accepts draws that decrease the likelihood function.
11 
 
We analyze endogenous participation in French  public timber auctions using a system of 
three equations. Equation (1) determines the selection process. In other words, it is the 
probability that there is at least one bid. In case the bidders do not participate in the auction 
(no bid), the expected payoff of participating, w1,i, is zero or negative. Thus, we define y1,i  1 
if at least one bidder participates in the auction and y1,i  0 otherwise where i indexes the i
th 
lot. 
                                                 
10 The Gibbs algorithm is an MCMC algorithm that iteratively draws from the conditional posterior distributions 
of the parameters and always accepts such draws. 
 
11 See Chen et al. (2000).   15 
 
      1  if w1,i  0 
  y1,i                        (1) 
      0  if w1,i  0 
 
where w1,i  x1,i 1  1,i, 1 is of dimension k1 and x1,i is a set of control variables. 
 
Equation  (2)  determines  the  outcome  of  the  endogenous  ordinal  variable  in  the  selected 
sample.
12 We define y2,i as an ordinal variable that can take on J values (in the application J = 
3). 
      1  if w2,i  1 
      ...         
  y2,i      j  if j1  w2,i  j    if y1,i  1      (2) 
      ... 
      J  if w2,i  J1 
where w2,i  x2,i 2  2,i, 2 is of dimension k2 and x2,i is a set of control variables. We define 
  (1, ..., J1) as the vector of cutoff parameters to be estimated. 
 
Finally, equation (3) is the hedonic price equation that explains the highest bid  w3,i as a 
function of lot characteristics and the endogenous ordinal participation variable y2,i included 
as a set of J1 binary variables.
13 Equation (3) is only observed for lots that have received at 
least one bid (y1,i  1). 
 
  w3,i  z3,i 3  z2,i 2  3,i  x3,i 3  3,i   observed for y1,i  1      (3) 
 
                                                 
12 Generally, we only observe the endogenous ordinal variable (2) in the selected sample. For instance, in the 
application, the ordinal variable is the extent of auction  participation,  which is only  observed for lots that 
received at least one bid. The observed equation (3) explains the highest bid. 
13 We decompose the ordinal variable in a set of binary variables so that our results do not depend on the way 
we have coded the ordinal variable. This is not an issue in equation (2) since the methodology automatically 
determine the cut-off points regardless of the values of the ordinal variable.   16 
where z2,i  (z2,2,i, ... , z2,J,i) with z2,j,i  1 if y2,i  j (and z2,j,i  0 otherwise, j  2, ..., J), 2 is a 
vector of parameters of dimension J1, x3,i  (z3,i, z2,i) and 3  (3, 2). 
 
We  assume  that  i    (1,i,  2,i,  3,i)  is  normally  distributed  with  mean  (0,  0,  0)  and 
covariance  for i  1, …, n: 
 
      1  12  133   
   =     12  1  233   
      133  233  3
2   
 
Parameters 12, 13 and 23 represent the correlations between the unobservable variables. 
Hence, 13 is the correlation coefficient of the Heckman sample selection procedure, while 
23 is related to the lack of competition for the lot in the hedonic price equation. Parameter 
3
2 is the variance of 3,i. Since probit equations (1) and ordinal probit equation (2) are not 
identified, we had to impose two restrictions. We chose to normalize the variances of the 




We always observe (x1,i, y1,i), but we only observe y2,i and w3,i when y1,i  1.
15 Moreover, the 
variables w1,i and w2,i are latent. The vector of explanatory variables can be stacked in order 
to write the (partially) latent model as a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model with 
an unequal number of observations. Let n1 be the number of observations for which y1,i  0 
and n2 the number of observations such that y1,i = 1, with n  n1n2. We now assume for 
notational convenience that the data have been sorted according to the values of y1. We also 
note the vector of binary dependent variables as y = (y1, y2). Let   (1, 2, 3), w1  
(w1,1, …, w1,n), w2  (w2,1, …, w2,n2) , w3  (w3,1, …, w3,n2) and define w = (w1, w2, w3). 
We define 1, 2, 3 and  in a similar fashion.  
 
                                                 
14 See Wooldridge (2002) or any other textbook on the econometrics of qualitative dependant variable. 
15 The econometric model identifies all parameters associated with x 1, x2 and x3 because of the non-linearity of 
the Mill's ratio. However, in most sample selection specifications, some variables are usually not available for 
the censored observations, which means that the set of variables in x1 is usually smaller than in x2 and x3.   17 
For notational convenience, we decompose the vectors of unobservable variables according 
to the selection process:   (11, 12, 2, 3), where the second index equals 1 if y1,i  0 and 
equals 2 if y1,i  1. Thus the covariance of the unobservable variables is simply 
 
        In1    0     
   = E =    0    In2     
 
where Ij denotes the identity matrix of dimension jj. Thus 
1 is readily obtained. We also 
decompose and stack the vector of the partially latent dependent variables as w = (w11, w12, 
w2, w3) and define similarly 
 
      x11  0  0   
  X =     x12  0  0    (n13n2)(k1k2k3) 
      0  x2  0   
      0  0  x3     
 
The (partially) latent model can be written in matrix format: 
 
  w  X                      (4) 
 
Hence conditional on w and , the estimates of  are simply obtained by a Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) regression of ().
16 Moreover, the matrices X
-1X and X
1w required for 
the GLS estimates of the parameters of the model are easily computed. 
 
The  4  steps  of  the  Metropolis-Gibbs  algorithm  are  described  in  appendix  1,  and  the 
computation of the partial effects can be found in appendix 2. We have used a flat prior in the 
Bayesian estimation of the parameters. The model can be extended to include informative 
prior so as to update implicit prices as the auction process moves on. However, with the large 
                                                 
16  Since  each  stage  contains  different  number  of  observations  and  generally  different  sets  of  explanatory 
variables, we can not estimate the SUR model with ordinary least squares regression applied to each latent 
equation separately. 
   18 
number observations that we have, this procedure is mostly relevant for the first auctions, 
given that at the end of the auction, the likelihood function will completely dominate the prior 
distribution in the posterior distribution.
17 
5  Results 
We estimate the parameters of equations (1), (2) and (3) using the MCMC algorithm. Table 4 
gives the Bayesian estimation of the 3-equation model.
18 All the variables available have been 
used to build the model but only significant variables have been kept in each equation. The 
signs of the estimated coefficients  are coherent  and intuitive, except for the variable „no 
restriction‟ for which the coefficient is surprisingly negative in equation (3). 
Remember equation (1) gives the probability that a lot will receive at least one bid. Equation 
(2) gives the intensity of competition (i.e the number of bidders) for a lot: (i) probability that 
there  is  no  competition,  i.e.  only  1  bid,  (ii)  probability  that  there  are  2  bids,  and  (iii) 
probability that there are 3 or more bids. Equation (3) gives the estimated value of the log of 
the highest bid. 
 
Table 4 - Bayesian estimation of the 3-equation model 
Variable    Coef.  Std. Dev. 
Equation (1)       
selection cutting & other cutting  **  -0.4762  0.2188 
accidental products  ***  -1.2381  0.2957 
previously unsold  ***  -2.9745  0.4589 
difficult & very difficult logging & extraction  *  -0.2824  0.1513 
Herfindahl index  **  0.6432  0.3182 
                                                 
17 To conclude this methodological section, one could wonder if we need three equations. Our model could have 
been written within an ordered probit framework if one only uses one latent variable for the number of bidders 
(lots  without  bids  are  interpreted  as  censored  observations).  However  this  specification  is  not  as  flexible, 
because  it  implies  that  the  unobservable  variable  that  determine  whether  a  lot  receives  at  least  one  bid  is 
perfectly correlated with the unobservable variable that determine the number of bidders conditional on a lot 
receiving at least one bid. There are indeed good reasons to believe that these unobservable variables are not 
perfectly correlated. 
18 Convergence of the MCMC algorithm was reach quickly. We removed the first 100000 iterations and kept the 
next 1000000 iterations for inference.   19 
mitraille  **  -0.3139  0.1393 
number of trees  ***  0.3526  0.0773 
arranged landing area  ***  0.5380  0.1654 
normal quality  ***  -0.5020  0.1429 
mediocre & bad quality  ***  -0.5174  0.1842 
beech volume without crown  *  0.0726  0.0375 
first sale  ***  -1.4172  0.1860 
_cons  ***  1.7395  0.6587 
Equation (2)       
selection cutting & other cutting  ***  -0.4899  0.1959 
previously unsold  ***  -0.7265  0.0881 
normal logging  ***  -0.3643  0.1033 
difficult & very difficult logging & extraction  ***  -0.5620  0.1375 
Herfindahl index  ***  1.9769  0.3322 
light mitraille  ***  -0.4324  0.1263 
average mitraille  ***  -0.4563  0.1753 
heavy mitraille  ***  -0.7949  0.2410 
relative order of the auction  ***  0.4587  0.1430 
conversion of a stand  **  0.2062  0.0989 
arranged landing area  ***  0.4106  0.1148 
normal quality  ***  -0.2891  0.0924 
mediocre & bad quality  ***  -0.6658  0.1340 
surface  ***  -0.2640  0.0818 
other hardwood volume without crown  ***  0.1603  0.0367 
oak volume without crown  ***  0.2575  0.0363 
beech volume without crown  ***  0.2094  0.0330 
first sale  ***  -0.5220  0.1811 
1  ***  1.4265  0.4095 
2 ***  2.0618  0.0437 
Equation (3)       
no restrictions  ***  -0.0884  0.0308 
accidental products  ***  -0.4538  0.1116 
regeneration cutting  ***  0.1258  0.0311 
previously unsold  ***  -0.1049  0.0366 
density  ***  0.0053  0.0011 
difficult & very difficult logging & extraction  **  -0.0910  0.0384 
Herfindahl index  ***  0.9270  0.1412 
mitraille  **  -0.0763  0.0348 
number of trees  ***  0.3735  0.0374 
relative order of the auction  ***  0.1635  0.0461   20 
conversion of a stand  ***  0.1413  0.0350 
coppice forest & coppice with standards  ***  0.1978  0.0541 
no landing area  **  -0.1563  0.0682 
normal quality  ***  -0.1159  0.0298 
mediocre & bad quality  ***  -0.2261  0.0485 
surface  ***  0.2348  0.0438 
other hardwood volume without crown  ***  0.0581  0.0162 
oak volume without crown  ***  0.1885  0.0171 
crown hardwood volume  ***  0.0646  0.0099 
beech volume without crown  ***  0.0964  0.0145 
stem volume of the mean-tree  ***  0.4507  0.0269 
first sale  *  0.1139  0.0589 
last sale  ***  0.1617  0.0355 
y2   one bid  ***  -0.2231  0.0581 
y2   three or more bids  ***  0.3709  0.0657 
_cons ***  3.4837  0.1526 
    -0.0147  0.0581 
13    -0.0482  0.1296 
23    -0.0254  0.1242 
3 ***  0.3837  0.0093 
 
We also have estimated the probit equation (1) and the ordinal probit equation (2) separately 
and ran a Heckit procedure using sample selection equation (1) and hedonic bid equation (3) 
as benchmarks. Results were similar to the Bayesian estimation
19. This is expected since the 
coefficient associated with the inverse Mills ratio is not significantly different from zero. 
However, this result is not reliable with the Heckit p rocedure and depends on the variables 
used to build the model. Actually, if we use only variables that are available in the sale 
catalogue, we may observe a selection bias while the Bayesian procedure does not detect any 
problem of sample selection bias.
20 Therefore estimations of the correlation coefficients  13 
using the Heckit procedure can lead to misleading inference. 
 
Controlling for endogenous participation and for the characteristics of the lots, we find that, 
compared to the highest bid for lots with two bids, on average: (i) lots with only one bid 
                                                 
19 Results of these preliminary estimations are available upon request. 
20 Such a model is available upon request.   21 
receive a highest bid that is 22.31% below and (ii) lots with three or more bids receive a 
highest bid that is 37.09% higher.  These results on the cost of low competition are very 
significant and imply that it is important for the seller to have enough bidders for each timber 
lot. This objective must be kept in mind when she determines the number of lots to put on the 
market,  their  size  and  their  composition.  In  addition,  it  would  be  wise  to  consider  any 
improvement in  the sale format that would lower the participation cost  for any potential 
buyer. For example, a better description of the lots (eventually by a third party and with 
pictures on Internet for example) could encourage some potential buyers to bid on lots that 
they did not visit. 
 
Two other results deserve special mention. First, the degree of intra-lot heterogeneity is a 
significant variable in all 3 equations: the Herfindahl index has a significant positive effect. 
Thus, during an auction with at least one bidder, competition increases for lots that are more 
homogenous in species, i.e. with an Herfindahl index closer to one. In addition, a higher 
Herfindahl index increases the highest bid. Thus, concentrated lots with a Herfindahl index 
close to 1 (in other words lots that are not heterogeneous) have a sale premium. Boltz, Carter 
and Jacobson (2002) highlight the importance of intra-lot heterogeneity on auction prices of 
mixed species lots from timber auctions in North Carolina. Their Tobit estimation results (the 
reserve price being announced) show that increased heterogeneity leads to lower sale prices. 
In some way, they interpret such decrease in the revenue as an opportunity cost for ecosystem 
management  where  biodiversity  is  a  desired  constraint.  Here,  the  opportunity  cost  of 
maintaining mixed forest can be estimated from the partial effect associated to the Herfindahl 
index: increasing the index by 1% increases the expected highest bid by 0.9164%. This figure 
can be found in Table 5 below which gives the partial effect for every variable used in this 
model. The partial effect of a variable corresponds here to the total impact of that variable on 
the expected log of the highest bid taking into account the possible selection bias of non 
submitted lots and the impact of that variable on the number of bidders. 
 
Second,  the  coefficient  associated  with  the  „relative  position  of  a  lot‟  in  the  sale  is 
significantly positive in equation (2) and (3). This indicates that lots put on the market at the 
end of a sale have a higher probability to receive more bids and to obtain a better highest bid 
than lots auctioned in the beginning of the sale, after we control for quality differences. This 
last  result  implies  that  the  decline  in  prices  often  observed  in  sequential  auctions  is  not 
present  in  our  sample  of  timber  auctions.  On  the  contrary,  prices  tend  to  increase  for   22 
hardwood lots during a sale. This could be due to cautious behavior of the bidders in the 
beginning  of  the  auctions  and  more  aggressive  bids  at  the  end  of  the  auctions.  This 
interpretation is confirmed by two additional results. First, the probability that a lot receives 
at least one bid is significantly lower in the first sale of the campaign. The variable „first sale‟ 
has a significant negative impact in equation (1) and (2): bidders wait and see. Second, the 
variable „last sale‟ has a significant positive impact in the hedonic price equation (3). This 
result reinforces the „relative position of a lot‟ variable on a larger scale. Indeed, the highest 
bid increases during a sale (which is composed of many timber lots put on sale the same day), 
moreover the highest bids tend to be higher in the tenth sale (the one that took place the last 
day of the timber sale campaign). 
 
Table 5 – Partial effects 
    Partial effects  Std. Dev. 
no restrictions  ***  -0.0887  0.0313 
selection cutting & other cutting    -0.0011  0.0230 
accidental products  ***  -0.4139  0.1163 
regeneration cutting  ***  0.1253  0.0312 
previously unsold  **  -0.1725  0.0745 
density  ***  0.0053  0.0011 
normal logging  *  -0.0102  0.0059 
difficult & very difficult logging & extraction  ***  -0.1156  0.0411 
Herfindahl index  ***  0.9164  0.1580 
mitraille  *  -0.0708  0.0384 
light mitraille  *  -0.0115  0.0068 
average mitraille    -0.0121  0.0080 
heavy mitraille  *  -0.0174  0.0103 
number of trees  ***  0.3352  0.0469 
relative order of the auction  ***  0.1791  0.0459 
conversion of a stand  ***  0.1472  0.0342 
coppice forest & coppice with standards  ***  0.1989  0.0553 
arranged landing area    0.0140  0.0249 
no landing area  **  -0.1565  0.0667 
normal quality  ***  -0.1125  0.0368 
mediocre & bad quality  ***  -0.2595  0.0531 
surface  ***  0.2265  0.0448 
other hardwood volume without crown  ***  0.0631  0.0159   23 
oak volume without crown  ***  0.1963  0.0166 
crown hardwood volume  ***  0.0648  0.0100 
beech volume without crown  ***  0.0949  0.0171 
stem volume of the mean-tree  ***  0.4516  0.0276 
first sale    0.1168  0.0787 
last sale  ***  0.1618  0.0348 
 
6  Conclusion 
Using detailed data set on timber auctions in Lorraine, we have highlighted the importance of 
endogenous participation on auction results, focusing on lots that do not receive any bids and 
on  the  degree  of  competition  when  lots  receive  at  least  one  bid.  We  have  proposed  a 
methodology to deal with both issues at the same time. The econometric method can easily be 
extended  to  deal  with  truncated  or  censored  dependant  variables  in  the  hedonic  price 
equation, when the reserve price is announced. 
 
Our results can help public forest services to determine a relevant reserve price for each lot 
according  to  its  characteristics.  In  order  to  avoid  auctions  with  one  bid  or  less,  the 
methodology could also be used to propose more attractive lots and to better understand 
demand factors. Our hedonic price function for stumpage value gives interesting information 
about the implicit price of each lot characteristic for the optimal lot composition. We have 
discussed the impact of the relative order of the lot in the sale and the impact of the intra lot 
heterogeneity, but our results show that many variables have a  significant impact on the 
participation process and on the auctioned price including the type of cutting, the type of 
stand, the harvesting conditions, the volume and the composition of the lot. These results can 
help the forest public services to manage forest more efficiently so as to offer more attractive 
lots. Besides, our results highlight on the high cost of the low participation in French timber 
auctions and lead us to recommend any measure that would increase the number of bidders. 
In particular, it would be wise to implement any idea that would lower participating cost. 
   24 
Finally, our methodology can also be useful for bidders to define a bid that increases their 
probability of winning at a lower cost. Models can be elaborated according to which variables 
are available to the agent just before the auction.   25 
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Appendix 1: The Metropolis-Gibbs sampling algorithm 
The Metropolis-Gibbs sampling algorithm proceeds in 4 steps. The first step is a standard 
data augmentation step. We use a uniform prior for , , 12, 13, 23 and a non-informative 
prior for 3: p(, , 12, 13, 23, 3)  1/3.
21 To simplify notations we have dropped the 
dependence of   on  and the dependence of  on (12, 13, 23, 3) when there is no 
ambiguity. 
Step 1. w1, w2 | , , , w3, y, X 
In the first step, we only need to draw w1 and w2 since w3 is observed. When y1,i  0, we 
know that w1,i  0, hence for those observations (i  1, …, n1), we draw w1,i from the standard 
truncated normal distribution with mean x1,i1 and variance 1 truncated on (-, 0). We use 
the optimal algorithm of Robert (1995) to draw from the truncated normal distribution.
22 For 
the other observations (i  n11, …, n), we know that conditionally on , , , y, X, (w1,i, 
w2,i, w3,i) has a joint normal distribution with mean (x1,i1, x2,i2, x3,i3) and covariance . 
Thus, 
 
   w1,i | w2,i, , , , y, w3, X  TN(1|23, 1|23; B1)  
 
where  TN(a,  b;  c)  denotes  the  normal  distribution  with  mean  a,  variance  b  truncated  in 
subspace c and B1  {z1  R: z1 > 0}. The conditional moments 1|23 and 1|23 are given by 
the standard formulas of the conditional distribution from a multivariate normal distribution. 
Similarly,  
 
   w2,i | w1,i, , , , y, w3, X  TN(2|13, 2|13; B2)  
 
                                                 
21 The choice of the prior distribution does not matter much when there is a large number of observations, which 
is usually the case for auction data. Moreover, using the uniform prior distribution provides a direct mean of 
comparison with the maximum likelihood procedures. 
22 Using the inverse c.d.f. method yielded unreliable results.   29 
where B2j  {z  R: aj1 < z  aj} if y2,i  j (by convention, 0   and J = ). 
Step 2.  | , , y, w, X 
It is easy to see that the conditional posterior distribution of j is (for j  1, ..., J1): 
  j | , , y, w, X  U(Max{w2,i: y2,i  j}, Min{w2,i: y2,i  j1}) 
Step 3.  | , , y, w, X 
As discussed in the presentation of the (partially) latent model, the conditional distribution of 
 is readily seen to be: 






Step 4.  | , , y, w, X 
The conditional posterior distribution of  is not standard, 
 
   | , , y, w, X  ||
-n2/2 exp
1/2) / 3, 
 
but can be simulated using Metropolis step. Define  = (12, 13, 23, 3). We use a normal 
jumping distribution N(,  I44).
23 
 
                                                 
23 We set the elements of  in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain an acceptance rate between 0.2 and 
0.25. In general a large step size decreases the speed of convergence of the algorithm but enables to get out of 
problematic  areas  of  the  likelihood  function  more  quickly,  while  a  small  value  would  make  the  algorithm 
converge faster at the cost of getting stuck in undesirable areas. The range of values that we have used is 
standard for the number of parameters used in the application and was found to be a good compromise between 
the two effects mentioned above. Note that this range of acceptance rates has been shown to be optimal for 
MCMC algorithms that use a normal jumping distribution. For other sampling schemes, the optimal acceptance 
rate has to be computed and could be different from the above values. Draws that resulted in values of the 
correlation coefficients below -1 or above 1, as well as draws not resulting in a positive covariance matrix were 
rejected. Note also that we used a log transformation of the various probabilities in order to avoid numerical 
underflows.   30 
Appendix 2: Computation of the partial effects 
Let X denotes the matrix of explanatory variables defined in the text. The observed highest 
bid equation is 
  w3  1 z22  22 z23+ z33  3              (A1) 
 
The expected bid conditional on participation is 
  E(w3 | X, y1=1) = 21 E(z22 | X, y11)  22 E(z23 | X, y11)  z33  1 (x11)  (A2) 
 
Where is () is the inverse mill ratio and 1 13/3. The partial effects of the last two terms 
of (A2) are given from standard computations in the Heckman model. It remains to find the 
partial effect with respect to the first two terms of the right-hand side of (A2). We can write 
(dropping the conditioning on X to simplify notations): 
 
  E(z22 | y11) = p(y2 = 2 | y11) = p(1x22  2  2x22 | 1  x11)  P1  (A3) 
 
  E(z23 | y11) = p(y2 = 3 | y11) = p(2  2x22 | 1  x11)  P2 
   
We decompose the conditional probability as follows: 
 
  P1 = D p(1x22  2  2x22 | 1) p(1 | 1  x11) d1,   
 
where D  [x11; ] is the domain of integration with respect to 1. Using the fact that 1 
is normally distributed, we can write where f() is the standard normal density. 
 
  P1  D p(1x22  2  2x22 | 1) (1) /(1(x11)) d1      (A4) 
 
Using a property of the conditional distribution of a normally distributed random variable, 
p(1x22  2  2x22 | 1) = E p(2 | 1) d2 = E 1; 112
2) d2, where E  
[1x222x22] and (a; b) denotes the density of a normally distributed variable with 
mean a and variance b. We use properties of the normal distribution to write 
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  p(1x22  2  2x22 | 1) = E (2) d2  
   ((2x22  (1)) /(112
2))  ((1x22  (1))/(112
2)),  (A5) 
 
where E  [(2x22  (1)) /(112
2); (1x22  (1))/(112
2)].  
 
Substituting (A5) in (A4), we have 
 
  P1  D [((2x22  (1)) /(112
2))  ((1x22  (1))/(112
2))] 
               (1) /(1(x11)) d1 
 
Similarly,  
  P2  D [1 ((2x22  (1))/(112
2))] (1) /(1(x11)) d1 
 
We  now  compute  the  partial  effect  of  P1  with  respect  to  xk  (the  implicit  price  of  the 
characteristic) that belongs to the set of variables x1 and x2: 
 
  P1/xk = [1(x11)]
1 {(x11) (-1k)/(1(x11))  
   D [((2x22(1))/(112
2))  ((1x22(1))/(112
2))] (1) d1 
   [((2x22( x11))/(112
2))  ((1x22( x11))/(112
2))]  
                     (x11) 1k 
   D [((2x22(1))/(112
2))  ((1x22(1))/(112
2))]  
                  (2k/(112
2)) (1) d1} 
 
Integrals in the previous formula can be computed by simulation using the GHK algorithm 
for instance. Similarly, 
 
  P2/xk = [1(x11)]
1 {(x11) (-1k)/(1(x11))  
   D [1 ((2x22(1))/(112
2))] (1) d1 
   [1  ((2x22( x11))/(112
2))] (x11) 1k 
   D [((2x22(1))/(112
2))] (2k/(112
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